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We investigate whether ownership concentration inﬂuences bank proﬁtability in a developing country context. We focus on
bank ownership concentration measured as the amount of direct equity held by a majority shareholder categorised into: high
ownership concentration, moderate ownership concentration and disperse ownership. We ﬁnd that banks with high ownership
concentration have higher return on assets, higher net interest margin and higher recurring earning power while banks with
dispersed ownership have lower return on assets but have higher return on equity. Also, higher cost efﬁciency improves the return
on assets of widely-held banks and the return on equity of banks with moderate ownership. The ﬁndings have implications.
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We investigate whether ownership structure, a corporate governance determinant, play an important role for bank
proﬁtability. More speciﬁcally, we examine whether different levels of ownership concentration can explain
differences in bank proﬁtability. The question whether ownership structure inﬂuences the proﬁtability of ﬁrms is
examined by a fairly large literature with rather mixed results depending on the context examined (Arun & Turner,
2004; Choi & Hasan, 2005; Chen, Harford & Li, 2007), and such studies focus largely on foreign ownership
(Greenaway, Guariglia & Yu, 2014), family ownership (De Massis, Kotlar, Campopiano & Cassia, 2013), state
ownership (Cornett, Guo, Khaksari & Tehranian, 2010) and institutional ownership (Elyasiani & Jia, 2010), with
little focus on direct equity holding of majority shareholders. In this study, we focus on a different ownership
structure categorisation involving direct equity ownership concentration.
Bank ownership concentration is important because it can inﬂuence (or limit) bank managers’ ability to divert bank
proﬁts as pecuniary beneﬁts to themselves or as private control beneﬁts to controlling shareholders which can lead to
a reduction in ﬁrm value and could potentially hurt non-controlling shareholders that do not have control stake in
banks. For instance, the 2004 to 2006 banking boom caused by excessive securitisation gains just before the 2008/10.1016/j.fbj.2017.07.001
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their own purposes, thereby increasing the risk of bank failure, and gave rise to the need to identify an optimal bank
ownership structure that improves bank performance while discouraging excessive risk-taking and misappropriation
of proﬁts among banks.
In Nigeria, the 2000–2010 banking reform led to bank mergers, acquisition and consolidation activities intended to
strengthen the banking sector, and the merger, acquisition and consolidation process led to signiﬁcant changes in
bank ownership to permit ownership by various wealthy families and rich individuals including few institutional
ownership in an attempt to reduce government's control of banks, which consequently led to greater number of
individual shareholders with large direct equity holding in Nigerian banks. Moreover, large direct equity ownership
by controlling shareholders can have serious consequences for bank proﬁtability depending on whether controlling
shareholders have private control beneﬁts or whether there are shared control beneﬁts that accrue to both controlling
and non-controlling owners, and this effect also depend on the levels of ownership concentration in Nigerian banks.
Therefore, our curiosity leads us to investigate the case of Nigeria to examine the inﬂuence of differing levels of
ownership concentration on bank proﬁtability and we focus on banks because they play an important role in the
ﬁnancial intermediation process in Nigeria and because they have additional characteristics that make them distinct
from non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Using a sample of Nigerian banks, we ﬁnd that banks with high ownership concentration are more proﬁtable: they
have higher return on assets (ROA), net interest margin (NIM) and recurring earning power (REP) while banks with
dispersed ownership have higher return on equity (ROE). Also, higher cost efﬁciency improves the return on assets
of banks that are widely-held and the return on equity of banks with moderate ownership.
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, we contribute to the literature that explores the relationship
between ownership concentration and ﬁrm proﬁtability. By focussing on banks, our analyses provide insights on how
different levels of bank ownership concentration affect bank proﬁtability, we show that high ownership concentration
has positive effects for ROA while dispersed ownership has positive effects for ROE while we observe no signiﬁcant
effect for moderate ownership in a developing country context. This insight gained can improve our understanding of
speciﬁc ownership structures that improve bank proﬁtability in developing countries. Secondly, our analyses
contribute to the rich literature that explores the impact of ownership structure on ﬁrm performance, we show that
apart from institutional ownership, family ownership and foreign bank ownership, direct equity ownership
concentration is also a determinant of bank proﬁtability for developing countries like Nigeria although this depends
on the proﬁtability metric employed. Thirdly, we contribute to the literature that explores the relationship between
ﬁrm proﬁtability and corporate governance determinants. By investigating a developing country context, we show
that ownership concentration, a corporate governance determinant, is a possible corporate governance factor affecting
bank proﬁtability for developing countries. Finally, in contrast to prior Nigerian studies (Tsegba & Herbert, 2013;
Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012; Gugong, Arugu & Dandago, 2014), we investigate Nigerian banks and divide banks
into three ownership categories to detect how concentrated ownership, moderate ownership and dispersed ownership
affects bank proﬁtability, an approach that has not being adopted by prior studies. This is our main contribution to the
literature on ownership concentration and bank proﬁtability in developing countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework.
Section 3 presents the relevant literature. Section 4 describes data, sample selection and ownership structure
categorisation. Section 5 describes the methodology. Section 6 discusses the results regarding the impact of
ownership concentration on bank proﬁtability. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical and contextual framework
Agency theory shows that managers use their discretion to pursue strategies that enrich themselves at the expense
of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers can appropriate proﬁts for personal use or to enhance their
non-salary income and this practice leads to the misallocation of proﬁts (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). Jensen and
Meckling (1976) demonstrate that when large shareholders are involved in ﬁrm decision making, as is the case in
Nigeria, the conﬂict of interest shifts from managers versus shareholders to controlling shareholders versus non-
controlling (or minority) shareholders. When the conﬂict of interest shifts to controlling shareholders versus non-
controlling (or minority) shareholders, internal corporate governance mechanisms may become less effective to
reduce the agency problems between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders because controlling
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controlling shareholders.
Moreover, the propensity for managers to misappropriate proﬁt in the short-term to beneﬁt themselves at the
expense of controlling and non-controlling shareholders tend to be greater if managers do not have substantial
ownership stake in ﬁrms they manage particularly in widely-held ﬁrms (that is, ﬁrms with dispersed ownership).
When this is the case, managers can misappropriate proﬁt for self-interest and such misappropriation of proﬁts would
negatively affect the level of reported proﬁt of the ﬁrm; therefore, a negative relationship between dispersed
ownership and proﬁtability can be expected. However, a positive relationship between dispersed ownership and
proﬁtability can be expected if widely-held ﬁrms are made up of dispersed shareholders that exert some monitoring
to limit managers from pursuing their self-interests, thus discouraging misappropriation of proﬁts for perks, and such
shareholders in widely-held ﬁrms may consist of bondholders, creditors, consumer protection agencies, government
agencies, etc.
On the other hand, controlling shareholders can elect their representative(s) to the board of directors who will
appoint a manager that will act in their self-interest. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
demonstrate that controlling shareholders can impose greater monitoring on management, and use their inﬂuence to
compel managers to make decisions that increase overall shareholder value for all, thereby beneﬁting all shareholders
including minority shareholders, which improves ﬁrm performance and proﬁtability. More so, the additional
monitoring imposed on managers by controlling shareholders can compel managers to maximise proﬁts for the ﬁrm;
hence, managers of ﬁrms with large controlling shareholders are less likely to pursue their selﬁsh interests because of
the additional monitoring imposed on them by controlling shareholders (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). As a
consequence, we expect a positive relationship between ﬁrm proﬁtability and concentrated ownership.
However, when controlling shareholders have incentives to maximize their own beneﬁts at the expense of non-
controlling shareholders, controlling shareholders will seek private beneﬁts of control such as the extraction of
corporate resources through perks or transfer of assets/proﬁts, which in turn would hurt non-controlling shareholders
through the resulting reduction in ﬁrm proﬁt and ﬁrm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When controlling
shareholders pursue such objectives that increase their personal utility rather than maximise proﬁt for all, then having
such controlling shareholders can lead to decreased proﬁtability for the ﬁrm. When this is the case, we expect a
negative relationship between ﬁrm proﬁtability and concentrated ownership.
In Nigerian banking, controlling (or large) shareholders are often owners of banks. Compared to the 1980s where
government-owned banks dominated the banking system in Nigeria, today banking in Nigeria has undergone
dramatic changes. Nigeria in recent times has a deeper banking system and a relatively stable banking system
although the challenges of high bank concentration, limited competition, rising non-performing loans, weak
corporate governance, ﬁnancial exclusion and sub-optimal ownership structure still persist. Controlling shareholders
in Nigerian banks have the largest ownership stake and wield signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the actions of top management
in banks. Controlling shareholders in Nigerian banks also inﬂuence the production of bank's accounting information
and inﬂuence bank managers to divert corporate proﬁts to themselves as private control beneﬁts while minority
shareholders suffer from the resulting reduction in ﬁrm value.
3. Literature review
The inﬂuence of ownership structure on ﬁrm performance has been examined in the literature with mixed
conclusions. Leech and Leahy (1991) ﬁnd a negative relationship between ownership concentration and proﬁtability
for large British companies implying that high ownership concentration has negative effects for proﬁtability.
Lehmann and Weigand (2000) investigate the impact of corporate governance on the performance of 361 German
ﬁrms during the 1991 to 1996 period and ﬁnd that ownership concentration negatively affect ﬁrm proﬁtability
although they observe that high ownership concentration only improves the proﬁtability of listed ﬁrms with large
shareholders. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between ownership structure and
ﬁrm performance. Welch (2003), adopting the model of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), examine the relationship
between ownership structure and the performance of Australian listed companies and ﬁnd that ownership by top
management signiﬁcantly inﬂuence ﬁrm performance measured as accounting rate of return, but did not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant result when ﬁrm performance is measured by Tobin's Q. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) investigate the
impact of ownership structure on ﬁrm performance among 175 Greek listed ﬁrms for the year 2000. After taking into
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ownership structure improves ﬁrm proﬁtability, and that higher ﬁrm proﬁtability require a less dispersed ownership.
In contrast, Pervan, Pervan, and Todoric (2012) examine the relationship between ownership structure and ROA for
listed ﬁrms in Croatia and ﬁnd that ﬁrms with dispersed ownership have higher ROA than those with concentrated
ownership. Phung and Mishra (2016) examine the effect of ownership structure on the performance of listed ﬁrms
over the 2007 to 2012 period and ﬁnd a non-linear relationship between ownership structure and ﬁrm performance.
They observe that foreign ownership improves ﬁrm performance up to a certain point beyond which higher foreign
ownership leads lowers ﬁrm performance. Lepore, Paolone, Pisano, and Alvino (2017) ﬁnd that higher ownership
concentration with an efﬁcient judicial system improves ﬁrm performance particularly in countries with weak
investor protection. Abdallah and Ismail (2017) ﬁnd that the positive relationship between corporate governance and
ﬁrm performance is an increasing function of dispersed ownership and that the value addition of good corporate
governance is not necessarily maintained at high levels of ownership concentration.
Among banks, Micco, Panizza, and Yanez (2006) investigate whether the performance of public and private banks
is driven by political considerations during the 1995 to 2002 period. They ﬁnd that state-owned banks located in
developing countries have lower proﬁtability and higher costs than their private-owned banks. They did not ﬁnd a
strong correlation between bank ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries. Iannotta,
Nocera, and Sironi (2007) investigate the relationship between ownership structure, risk taking and bank
performance for 181 European banks during the 1999–2004 period. They ﬁnd that ownership concentration does
not signiﬁcantly affect bank proﬁtability but rather high ownership concentration is associated with better loan
quality, lower asset risk and lower insolvency risk, thereby improving bank performance. Lin and Zhang (2009)
investigate the impact of bank ownership reform on the performance of Chinese banks. They examine 60 Chinese
banks during the 1997 to 2004 period, and ﬁnd that ‘Big Four’ commercial banks which have concentrated
ownership are less proﬁtable, less efﬁcient and have worse asset quality than other types of banks. Ben Slama and
Boulila (2014) investigate the relationship between ownership structure and bank performance with a focus on 53
Islamic banks over the 2005 to 2009 period. They did not ﬁnd a correlation between ownership concentration and
ﬁrm performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), amongst others. Bian and Deng
(2017) examine Chinese banks over the 2007–2014 period and ﬁnd that higher ownership dispersion improves return
on assets, return on equity and reduces the ratio of nonperforming loans. Overall, the literature on bank ownership
structure and ﬁrm performance provides mixed evidence.
Prior Nigerian studies examine the relationship between corporate governance and ﬁrm performance among non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Nigeria. Tsegba and Herbert (2013) investigate the relationship between foreign ownership
structure and ﬁrm performance for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms during the 2003 to 2007 period, and ﬁnd that foreign
ownership concentration has a negative impact on ﬁrm performance. Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) ﬁnd that
institutional ownership has positive effects for ROA while foreign ownership has positive effects for listed ﬁrms in
the ﬁnancial sector. Gugong et al. (2014) ﬁnd a positive signiﬁcant relationship between ownership structure and ﬁrm
performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). In contrast to prior Nigerian studies,
we investigate a different type of ownership concentration categorisation. More speciﬁcally, we focus on Nigerian
banks with controlling shareholders versus Nigerian banks with non-controlling shareholders and divide banks into
three ownership categories to detect how concentrated ownership, moderate ownership and dispersed ownership
affects bank proﬁtability in Nigeria. This is our main contribution to the scant literature on ownership concentration
and bank proﬁtability in developing countries.4. Data
4.1. Sample selection
Our study focus on Nigerian banks for which we extract bank ﬁnancial statement data from Bankscope database which provides detailed
information for Nigerian banks from 2006; hence, our dataset covers the 2006 to 2015 period. Data for 43 banks were obtained which consists of
only 33 active banks. We exclude banks with missing values for 4 consecutive periods, and the sample is reduced to a ﬁnal sample of 27 banks. Of
the 27 banks, 13 banks are listed while 14 banks are either non-listed or delisted. Bankscope provides information on whether a bank is listed, non-
listed or delisted. Finally, we did not make a distinction between commercial and non-commercial banks in order to obtain a large bank sample.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics including the mean and median for our data set.
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To measure different levels of bank ownership concentration, we use a simple criterion reﬂecting whether or not a bank has a majority
shareholder with at least 70% direct equity holding or less than 40% direct equity holdings. To capture high ownership concentration, we introduce
a dummy variable ‘CN’ that take the value of one if a majority shareholder has at least 70% direct equity holding, representing banks with
concentrated ownership. To capture dispersed ownership, we introduce a dummy variable ‘DISP’ that take the value of one if a majority
shareholder has less than 40% direct equity holding, representing banks with a dispersed ownership structure or banks that are widely held. To
capture moderate ownership concentration, we introduce a dummy variable ‘MOD’ that take the value of one if a majority shareholder has between
50% and 69% direct equity holding, representing banks with moderate ownership concentration. Of the 27 banks in our sample, 7 banks have a
majority shareholder with 70% direct equity holding (representing banks with high ownership concentration), 14 banks have a majority shareholder
with less than 40% direct equity holding (representing banks with dispersed ownership) while 6 banks have a majority shareholder with 50–69%
direct equity holding (representing banks with a moderate ownership).
5. Methodology
First, we follow prior literature to estimate bank proﬁtability determinants using a static and dynamic panel model
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007; Ozili, 2015; Ozili, 2017). We employ four
measures of bank proﬁtability (П) as a function of capital adequacy (EQTA), cost efﬁciency (CI), regulatory capital
ratio (TRC), asset quality (AQ) and macroeconomic growth rate (ΔGDP).
The model is given as:
Пi; t¼ cþCIi; tþAQi; tþEQTAi; tþTRCi; tþΔGDPtþεðOLSÞ ð1Þ
Пi; t¼ cþПi; t−1þCIi; tþAQi; tþEQTAi; tþTRCi; tþΔGDPtþεðGMMÞ ð2Þ
Where П is the dependent variable representing four measures of proﬁtability: return on assets (ROA), return on
equity (ROE), net interest margin (NIM) and recurring earnings power (REP). ROA is a measure of ﬁrm's operational
performance (Ozili, 2017), measured as the ratio of proﬁt after tax to average asset for bank ‘i’ at year ‘t’. Return on
equity (ROE) measures the return to equity shareholders measured as the ratio of proﬁt after tax to average equity for
bank ‘i’ at year ‘t’(Ozili, 2015). Net interest margin (NIM) measures the return to banks from interest-generating
activities while recurring earnings power (REP) measures the ability of a ﬁrm/bank to generate income or proﬁts over
time assuming all current operational conditions remain constant; and is measured as pre-provision proﬁt excluding
net income from ﬁnancial instruments and sale of securities and tax to average asset ratio. Cost efﬁciency (CI) is
measured as cost to income ratio for bank i at year t, reﬂecting banks’ efﬁciency. Asset quality (AQ)1 is measured as
loan loss reserves to gross loans for bank i in year t (Ozili, 2017). Capital adequacy (EQTA) is measured as total
equity to average assets for bank i in year t while regulatory capital ratio (TRC) is measured as tier 1þ2 capital
divided by total risk weighted assets (Ozili, 2015). Gross domestic product growth rate (ΔGDP) is measured as the
change in gross domestic product at year t. Next, we interact each proﬁtability determinants on the ownership
variables to detect the impact, if any, of different levels of ownership concentration on bank proﬁtability; thus, we
estimate the model:
Пi; t¼ cþDISP  CIi; tþDISP  AQi; tþDISP  EQTAi; tþDISP  TRCi; tþΔGDPtþε ð3Þ
Пi; t¼ cþПt−1þDISP  CIi; tþDISP  AQi; tþDISP  EQTAi; tþDISP  TRCi; tþΔGDPtþε ð4Þ
Пi; t¼ cþMOD  CIi; tþMOD  AQi; tþMOD  EQTAi; tþMOD  TRCi; tþΔGDPtþε ð5Þ
Пi; t¼ cþПi; t−1þMOD  CIi; tþMOD  AQi; tþMOD  EQTAi; tþMOD  TRCi; tþΔGDPtþε ð6Þ
Пi; t¼ cþCN  CIi; tþCN  AQi; tþCN  EQTAi; tþCN  TRCi; tþΔGDPtþε ð7Þ
Пi; t¼ cþПi; t−1þCN  CIi; tþCN  AQi; tþCN  EQTAi; tþCN  TRCi; tþΔGDPtþε ð8Þ
To estimate the model, we use static and dynamic estimation techniques. The static estimation is the ﬁxed effect
OLS estimator to capture bank-speciﬁc differences while the dynamic estimation is the GMM estimator to capture
dynamic adjustments to bank proﬁtability. We consider dynamic adjustments to bank proﬁtability by taking the lag1Other studies use loan loss provisions to gross loan to measure asset quality (Ozili & Outa, 2017, etc.)
Table 1A
:Summary of descriptive statistics.
ROA ROE NIM REP CI AQ EQTA TRC ΔGDP
Mean 1.909 7.024 9.352 3.267 70.498 4.641 17.979 23.392 5.9600
Median 1.800 12.75 7.470 3.090 64.460 3.590 13.750 19.800 6.300
Maximum 13.790 45.920 68.180 24.890 306.800 33.090 98.800 124.020 8.200
Minimum −8.050 −209.03 −1.120 −3.720 23.260 0.000 −12.080 −13.810 2.700
Std. Dev. 2.698 31.716 10.424 3.418 30.695 4.263 15.883 18.031 1.585
Observations 137 137 135 137 135 134 141 112 270
Table 1B
Ownership concentration and proﬁtability.
Banks with high ownership concentration
Proﬁtability (П) Mean Median S.D Observations
ROA 2.332 2.00 3.726 34
ROE 6.826 18.325 38.538 34
NIM 10.346 6.715 14.873 34
REP 4.073 3.150 5.755 34
Banks with moderate ownership
ROA 1.932 1.715 3.419 26
ROE 2.422 8.035 43.856 26
NIM 7.478 7.610 3.433 26
REP 2.944 3.095 2.960 26
Banks with dispersed ownership
ROA 1.714 1.770 1.741 77
ROE 8.665 12.710 22.639 77
NIM 9.524 7.700 9.561 77
REP 3.021 3.060 1.807 77
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argue that a proﬁtable bank in the current year is likely to remain proﬁtability in the next year due to proﬁt
persistence, thereby requiring analyses using lagged proﬁtability values because today's proﬁtability can potentially
explain tomorrow's proﬁtability. For the dynamic model, we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) ﬁrst-difference GMM
estimator to estimate the dynamic model. The GMM instruments are only applied to the lagged dependent variable
while the other variables are considered as strictly exogenous. We report the Hansen test (or the J-statistic). The
Hansen test checks for the validity, i.e. the exogeneity of the entire set of instruments as a group. Bank ﬁxed effect is
included in the OLS and GMM estimations. We discuss the results in section 5.
6. Discussion of results
6.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation
Table 1A reports the full sample descriptive statistics for the variables while Table 1B reports the descriptive
statistics for the proﬁtability variables for each level of ownership concentration. In Table 1B, banks with high
ownership concentration experience relatively higher return on assets (ROA), net interest margin (NIM) and
recurring earnings power (REP), implying that banks with high concentrated ownership have better operational
performance while banks with dispersed ownership have the lowest return on assets (ROA) but have the highest
return on equity (ROE) implying higher returns to shareholders in banks that are widely held (dispersed ownership).
Table 2 reports the correlation among the variables. Focussing on the correlation between the proﬁtability
measures (ROA, ROE, NIM and REP) and ownership concentration variables (DISP, MOD and CN), we observe
that DISP is positively correlated with proﬁtability: ROA, ROE, NIM and REP implying that dispersed bank
Table 2
Correlation matrix.
Variables ROA ROE NIM REP CI AQ EQTA TRC ΔGDP DISP CN MOD LISTED
ROA 1.000
ROE 0.839*** 1.000
0.000
NIM 0.007 0.027 1.000
0.942 0.784
REP 0.810*** 0.686*** −0.056 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.573
CI −0.839*** −0.767*** 0.143 −0.925*** 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.149 0.000
AQ −0.611*** −0.583*** 0.054 −0.369*** 0.482*** 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.588 0.000 0.000
EQTA 0.260*** 0.088 0.162 0.253*** −0.285*** −0.014 1.000
0.008 0.378 0.102 0.009 0.004 0.885
TRC 0.318*** 0.191* 0.069 0.268*** −0.325*** −0.171* 0.924*** 1.000
0.001 0.053 0.485 0.006 0.001 0.084 0.000
ΔGDP −0.177* −0.128 −0.080 −0.151 0.116 0.114 −0.052 −0.053 1.000
0.075 0.196 0.421 0.129 0.242 0.252 0.604 0.591
DISP 0.135 0.094 0.154 0.133 −0.142 −0.094 0.163* 0.140 0.207** 1.000
0.173 0.347 0.120 0.182 0.152 0.347 0.100 0.158 0.035
CN −0.089 −0.045 −0.102 −0.123 0.126 −0.007 −0.173* −0.148 0.127 −0.635*** 1.000
0.367 0.653 0.300 0.217 0.203 0.945 0.081 0.133 0.201 0.000
MOD −0.079 −0.072 −0.089 −0.042 0.0502 0.125 −0.029 −0.024 0.132 −0.614*** −0.219** 1.000
0.426 0.467 0.362 0.672 0.614 0.207 0.770 0.803 0.183 0.000 0.026
LISTED 0.100 0.004 0.172* 0.0114 0.035 0.056 0.148 0.145 0.230** 0.308*** 0.414*** 0.034 1.000
0.314 0.967 0.082 0.909 0.721 0.571 0.135 0.145 0.019 0.002 0.000 0.734
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Table 3
Bank proﬁtability determinants.
ROA ROE NIM REP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
C 10.088*** 140.97*** 9.359*** 6.441***
(8.75) (6.50) (2.89) (8.01)
ROAt-1 0.177
(0.98)
ROEt-1 0.036
(0.24)
NIMt-1 −0.011
(−0.02)
REPt-1 0.106
(1.49)
CI −0.084*** −0.128*** −1.469*** −1.541*** −0.043** −0.062 −0.079*** −0.081***
(−12.63) (−3.47) (−11.69) (−3.19) (−2.32) (−1.45) (−17.05) (−4.63)
AQ −0.212*** −0.028 −3.457*** −1.578 0.205* 0.343 0.053* −0.062
(−4.81) (−0.09) (−4.18) (−0.52) (1.66) (0.77) (1.72) (−0.55)
TRC −0.004 0.141 0.379 0.659 −0.007 −0.205 −0.016 0.0007
(−0.19) (1.28) (0.96) (0.58) (−0.12) (−1.02) (−1.09) (0.02)
EQTA −0.083* −0.032 −0.874 −1.627* 0.124 0.151 0.094*** 0.113***
(−1.85) (−0.38) (−1.03) (−1.88) (0.98) (1.42) (2.98) (3.25)
ΔGDP −0.056 −0.089 −1.617 −4.136* −0.009 −0.301 0.079 0.229*
(−0.57) (−0.36) (−0.88) (−1.89) (−0.04) (−1.03) (1.16) (1.91)
Adjusted R2 82.88 0.759 91.53 91.13
F-statistic 19.28 12.94 41.82 39.81
J-Statistic 3.28 0.79 103 6.962 1.99
P(J-Statistic) 0.35 0.85 0.07 0.57
Observation 103 64 103 64 103 63 103 64
OLS and GMM regression includes bank ﬁxed effect. Standard errors are not clustered. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote
statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. CI ¼ cost to income ratio, representing cost efﬁciency. AQ ¼ loan loss reserves to gross loan
ratio, representing asset quality. TRC ¼ total regulatory capital ratio, representing bank regulatory capital. EQTA ¼ equity to total asset ratio,
representing capital adequacy ratio. ΔGDP ¼ gross domestic product, growth rate, representing economic ﬂuctuations. Пt-1 representing lagged
proﬁtability values in ROAt-1, ROEt-1, NIMt-1, REPt-1
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NIM and REP implying that moderate bank ownership has a negative impact on bank proﬁtability. Similarly, CN is
also negatively correlated with proﬁtability: ROA, ROE, NIM and REP, implying that concentrated ownership has
negative effect for bank proﬁtability. Overall, the correlation coefﬁcients are not too high to be concerned with
multicollinearity in the study.6.2. Regression results
6.2.1. Proﬁtability determinants
Table 3 reports the result for bank proﬁtability determinants. As can be observed, CI coefﬁcient is negative and
signiﬁcantly associated with proﬁtability (measured as ROA, ROE and REP) in the static (OLS) and dynamic
(GMM) estimations, implying that cost efﬁciency is a signiﬁcant proﬁtability determinant for Nigerian banks. EQTA
coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcantly associated with proﬁtability (measured as REP) in the static (OLS) and
Table 4
Bank proﬁtability and dispersed ownership.
ROA ROE NIM REP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
c 7.629*** 49.326 7.089** 5.586***
(4.14) (1.32) (2.05) (3.87)
ROAt-1 0.279
(1.61)
ROEt-1 0.168
(1.37)
NIMt-1 −0.055
(−0.14)
REPt-1 −0.020
(−0.17)
DISP*CI −0.098*** −0.163** −0.821** −1.417* −0.018 −0.133 −0.097*** −0.137***
(−5.43) (−2.15) (−2.25) (−1.81) (−0.55) (−1.51) (−6.86) (−4.37)
DISP*AQ −0.169** −0.070 −3.102* −1.092 0.172 −0.142 0.092 −0.045
(−2.12) (−0.21) (−1.92) (−0.38) (1.15) (−0.41) (1.46) (0.28)
DISP*TRC 0.005 0.109 0.634 0.007 −0.011 −0.171 −0.008 −0.049
(0.13) (0.79) (0.88) (0.004) (-0.16) (−1.25) (−0.27) (0.72)
DISP*EQTA −0.063 −0.070 0.318 −1.517 0.171 0.025 0.073 0.049
(−0.82) (−0.54) (0.21) (−1.19) (1.19) (0.22) (1.22) (0.72)
ΔGDP −0.126 −0.293 −1.858 −5.033 0.065 −0.495 0.064 −0.045
(−0.81) (−0.68) (-0.59) (−1.14) (0.22) (−1.19) (0.53) (−0.15)
Adjusted R2 58.32 0.32 90.79 72.77
F-statistic 6.29 2.79 38.27 11.09
J-statistic 3.57 1.59 4.86 1.29
P(J-statistic) 0.31 0.66 0.18 0.73
Observation 103 64 103 64 103 63 103 64
OLS and GMM regression includes bank ﬁxed effect with no period ﬁxed effect. Standard errors are not clustered. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. CI ¼ cost to income ratio, representing cost efﬁciency. AQ ¼
loan loss reserves to gross loan ratio, representing asset quality. TRC ¼ total regulatory capital ratio, representing bank regulatory capital. EQTA
¼ equity to total asset ratio, representing capital adequacy ratio. ΔGDP ¼ gross domestic product growth rate, representing economic ﬂuctuations.
DISP ¼ dummy variable that equal one if the bank has a majority shareholder that holds less than 40% direct equity holding, representing banks
with dispersed ownership structure. Пt-1 representing lagged proﬁtability values in ROAt-1, ROEt-1, NIMt-1, REPt-1
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AQ, TRC and ΔGDP coefﬁcients report conﬂicting signs in the static (OLS) and dynamic (GMM) estimations.
6.2.2. Interaction regression: Ownership structure and bank proﬁtability
Table 4 reports the result for banks with dispersed ownership. DISP*CI coefﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcantly
associated with proﬁtability (ROA, ROE and REP) in the static (OLS) and dynamic (GMM) estimations, implying
that cost efﬁciency is a signiﬁcant proﬁtability determinant for banks with dispersed ownership. Also, DISP*AQ
coefﬁcient is negatively signiﬁcant in the static estimation and insigniﬁcant in the dynamic estimation. DISP*TRC,
DISP*EQTA and ΔGDP coefﬁcients report insigniﬁcant signs. Overall, the result implies that cost efﬁciency is a
signiﬁcant determinant of the return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and recurring earnings power (REP) of
banks with dispersed ownership and implies more efﬁcient banks have better ROA, ROE and REP.
Table 5 reports the result for banks with moderate ownership concentration. MOD*CI coefﬁcient is negative and
signiﬁcantly associated with proﬁtability (ROE) both in the static (OLS) and dynamic (GMM) estimations implying
that cost efﬁciency signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the level of ROE for Nigerian banks with moderate ownership
Table 5
Bank proﬁtability and moderate ownership concentration.
ROA ROE NIM REP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
c 3.286** 49.942** 8.712*** 2.486**
(2.44) (2.23) (3.80) (2.06)
ROAt-1 0.507
(1.09)
ROEt-1 0.374
(1.05)
NIMt-1 −0.156
(−0.33)
REPt-1 0.042
(0.07)
MOD*CI −0.081*** −0.155 −1.935*** −2.535** −0.073** −0.093 −0.065*** −0.017
(−4.35) (−1.60) (−6.25) (−1.99) (−2.29) (−0.78) (−3.86) (−0.09)
MOD*AQ −0.198 1.879 −2.619 31.956 0.203 −3.554 0.007 −0.350
(−0.96) (0.74) (−0.77) (0.63) (0.58) (−0.95) (0.04) (−0.05)
MOD*TRC 0.112 0.534 2.022 4.866 −0.029 0.027 0.022 1.411
(0.43) (0.47) (0.47) (0.39) (−0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.71)
MOD*EQTA −0.585 3.785* −10.636 13.77 0.387 4.164 0.064 2.228
(−1.35) (1.68) (−1.48) (0.21) (0.52) (0.85) (0.17) (0.31)
ΔGDP 0.067 −0.126 0.429 0.015 0.005 −0.009 0.118 0.199*
(0.41) (−0.42) (0.16) (0.01) (0.02) (−0.06) (0.79) (1.78)
Adjusted R2 51.26 46.73 91.11 58.20
F-statistic 4.97 4.31 39.69 6.26
J-Statistic 1.10 1.16 2.41 4.28
P(J-Statistic) 0.78 0.76 0.49 0.23
Observation 103 64 103 64 103 63 103 64
OLS and GMM regression includes bank ﬁxed effect with no period ﬁxed effect. Standard errors are not clustered. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. CI ¼ cost to income ratio, representing cost efﬁciency. AQ ¼
loan loss reserves to gross loan ratio, representing asset quality. TRC ¼ total regulatory capital ratio, representing bank regulatory capital. EQTA
¼ equity to total asset ratio, representing capital adequacy ratio. ΔGDP ¼ gross domestic product growth rate, representing economic ﬂuctuations.
MOD ¼ dummy variable that equal one if the bank has a majority shareholder that holds between 50% to 69% direct equity holding, representing
banks with a moderate ownership structure. Пt-1 representing lagged proﬁtability values in ROAt-1, ROEt-1, NIMt-1, REPt-1
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in the static and dynamic estimations.
Table 6 reports the result for banks with high ownership concentration. CN*CI coefﬁcient is negative and
signiﬁcantly associated with proﬁtability (ROA) in the static model and is insigniﬁcant in the dynamic model,
providing conﬂicting results. Also, CN*AQ coefﬁcient is negatively signiﬁcant in the static model and insigniﬁcant
in the dynamic model while CN*TRC, CN*EQTA and ΔGDP coefﬁcients also report insigniﬁcant signs. Drawing
inference from the two estimations, the results show that the proﬁtability determinants report conﬂicting signs.
6.2.3. Sensitivity analysis: OLS vs GMM
To address some concern in favour of using one estimation technique i.e. OLS or GMM instead of both
techniques, we use two estimation techniques to show that some of the main ﬁndings are not sensitive to alternative
estimations particularly when proﬁt persistence is taken into account. Assuming we use only OLS ﬁndings in
Table 4, for instance, we observe that cost efﬁciency and asset quality are signiﬁcant determinants of ROA and ROE
for banks with dispersed ownership but these results do not hold true for asset quality when we adjust for proﬁt
Table 6
Bank proﬁtability and high ownership concentration.
ROA ROE NIM REP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
c 3.661*** 54.224** 9.728*** 3.695***
(2.81) (2.28) (4.33) (3.25)
ROAt-1 −0.509
(−0.91)
ROEt-1 −1.157
(−1.05)
NIMt-1 −0.606
(−0.53)
REPt-1 −0.725*
(−1.73)
CN*CI −0.077*** 0.019 −1.767*** −0.449 −0.035 0.221 −0.076*** 0.257
(−3.32) (0.07) (−4.16) (−0.10) (−0.87) (0.71) (−3.77) (0.91)
CN*AQ −0.526** −2.710 −3.278 −0.449 0.469 −0.885 −0.166 −3.074
(−2.11) (−1.32) (−0.72) (−0.10) (1.09) (−0.68) (−0.76) (−1.29)
CN*TRC 0.059 3.723 −1.636 6.293 −0.027 1.252 −0.016 1.756
(0.34) (0.99) (−0.52) (0.77) (−0.09) (0.45) (−0.11) (1.19)
CN*EQTA −0.429 −6.958 −0.513 −1.267 −0.027 −2.095 0.009 −3.861
(−1.24) (−1.31) (−0.08) (−1.06) (−0.09) (−0.65) (0.03) (−1.35)
ΔGDP −0.002 0.364 −2.208 5.145 −0.095 0.141 0.041 0.309**
(−0.01) (1.15) (−0.71) (1.31) (−0.32) (0.37) (0.28) (2.61)
Adjusted R2 48.65 32.45 90.41 58.47
F-statistic 4.58 2.81 36.63 6.32
J-statistic 0.62 0.32 4.17 2.95
P(J-statistic) 0.90 0.96 0.24 0.40
Observation 103 64 103 64 103 63 103 64
OLS and GMM regression includes bank ﬁxed effect with no period ﬁxed effect. Standard errors are not clustered. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. CI ¼ cost to income ratio, representing cost efﬁciency. AQ ¼
loan loss reserves to gross loan ratio, representing asset quality. TRC ¼ total regulatory capital ratio, representing bank regulatory capital. EQTA
¼ equity to total asset ratio, representing capital adequacy ratio. ΔGDP ¼ gross domestic product growth rate, representing economic ﬂuctuations.
CN ¼ dummy variable that equal one if the bank has a majority shareholder that holds at least 70% direct equity holding, representing banks with
concentrated ownership structure. Пt-1 representing lagged proﬁtability values in ROAt-1, ROEt-1, NIMt-1, REPt-1
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is a signiﬁcant determinant of ROA, ROE, NIM and REP for banks with moderate ownership but the result only
holds true for ROE when we adjust for proﬁt persistence using the dynamic model. Similarly, focusing on the OLS
results in Table 6, we observe that cost efﬁciency and asset quality are signiﬁcant determinants of ROA for banks
with high ownership concentration but the results report conﬂicting evidence when we adjust for proﬁt persistence
using the dynamic model. Therefore, we base our ﬁnal inference on the ﬁndings that do not change when both the
static and dynamic estimations are used.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we examine the impact of different levels of ownership concentration on bank proﬁtability in
Nigeria. The ﬁndings indicate that banks with high concentrated ownership have higher return on assets, net interest
margin and recurring earnings power, implying that banks with high ownership concentration have better operational
performance while banks with dispersed ownership have the lowest return on assets and have the highest return on
P.K. Ozili, O. Uadiale / Future Business Journal 3 (2017) 159–171170equity, implying that banks with dispersed ownership provide better returns to shareholders. We also ﬁnd that higher
efﬁciency has positive effects for ROA among banks with dispersed ownership, and has positive effects for ROE for
banks with moderate ownership concentration. The implication of the ﬁndings is that, although banks with
concentrated ownership record higher proﬁtability, their proﬁtability do not appear to be signiﬁcantly driven by
economic drivers of bank proﬁtability.
For policy purposes, if bank regulators/supervisors are concerned about improving bank proﬁtability, we
recommend that bank regulators should encourage concentrated bank ownership provided that control beneﬁts are
shared between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Policy makers should encourage high concentrated
ownership which can help improve ﬁrm performance. Moving forward, future research could investigate the impact
of foreign ownership and institutional ownership on bank proﬁtability in developing countries. Also, in other
developing countries where the government has full or part ownership of banks, future research could examine
whether full or part state ownership of banks improves banks’ operational performance in developing counties.
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